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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 181050

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TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ JA KS IT

SUBJECT: IRAQ: GUIDANCE FOR BILATERALS WITH ROK AND JAPAN

Classified By: NEA DAS L. VICTOR HURTADO,
ACTING FOR REASONS 1.4 (A), (B), AND (D)

¶1. (C) Department instructs a delegation led by Deputy S/I Barbara Stephenson to participate in bilateral talks with the Republic of Korea (ROK) on Friday Nov 3 and with Japan on Nov 6-7 to discuss ongoing and future cooperation in Iraq. The focus of the ROK talks is to define a concept of operations for the ROK-U.S. Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) planned for Erbil. The focus of the Japan talks is to request Japanese logistic airlift support for the Italian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in DhiQar and to explore how to create the conditions necessary for Japan to disburse the significant loans it pledged to Iraq in 2004.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA: BACKGROUND

¶2. (C) The ROK contributes significantly to Iraq's security and stability, and the USG would like to see a robust ROK engagement to continue. ROK commands one of three internationally led multinational divisions (MND-NE), but by mid-2007 ROK's Iraq troop strength will be half its original deployment. The ROK also plays an important role in providing middle ring security for the UN Protection Force (UNPF). Lastly, as we continue to work with the ROK in planning for an RRT based in Erbil, we need to define a concept of operations that both military and political elements clearly understand and support, both in capitals and the field.

JAPAN: BACKGROUND

¶3. (C) This summer Japan drew to a close a very successful chapter of its contributions to Iraq by withdrawing its ground forces from Iraq after Muthanna province transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control in July 2006. At present Japan is reluctant to contribute to PRTs; its expanded C-130 air routes in support of MNF-I and UNAMI have a very small footprint; and it has few staff dedicated to administer Japan's massive financial aid to Iraq. The USG would like to encourage Japan to expand its present engagement in Iraq.

INSTRUCTIONS

¶4. (C) Drawing on points below, delegation should pursue the following:

ROK

Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT)

- (C/REL ROK) Ascertain ROK vision & objectives: What are RRT's goals and how long is ROK's commitment? How will it be different from existing ROK Civil Military Operations in Erbil? What are ROK views on building local governance capacity, on improving rule of law, on engaging minorities inside Kurdistan? What has ROK budgeted for and how long?

Does ROK intend to focus on Erbil, or also to do work in Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah? What expertise will ROK deploy? Will staff be all civilian or civ-mil mix? Does ROK have adequate liaison with the NCT?

- (C/REL ROK) Define concept of RRT operations including: command and control structure--co-lead with U.S., or ROK lead? If co-lead, how will projects work vis-a-vis decision-making, funding, etc? If ROK lead, are they willing to engage in issues beyond reconstruction such as rule of law, transparency and governmental institution building? What decisions is Korean RRT leader authorized to make in the field and what decisions get referred back to Seoul?

- (C/REL ROK) Verify logistical arrangements: e.g. security for ROK personnel (static, movement in Erbil and to other cities, and QRF) and perimeter security for full RRT; life support including medical and medevac; RRT's access to MNF-I threat info. Will ROK offer life support at Camp Zaytun to all U.S. RRT members? What other assets will be available to U.S. RRT members? How will we negotiate a formal support/reimbursement mechanism and through what channels? Would like Korean RRT leader to deploy as soon as possible. An effective civil-military interface is always a challenge--how does ROK intend to structure civ-mil communications in the RRT?

MND Command

- (C/REL ROK) Iraq is entering a critical phase where the Coalition is transferring security lead to Iraqi Security

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Forces. It is essential that the Coalition transforms to a supporting function with Iraqi security forces in the lead. The Coalition will concentrate on training, humanitarian and economic assistance.

- (C/REL ROK) We believe your forces in Iraq are ideally positioned to be the vanguard of this transformation. Korean forces are invaluable in northern Iraq. They are leading the transformation in Irbil, and demonstrate to the entire nation what the Coalition can bring to other provinces.

- (C/REL ROK) ROK forces also serve the strategic goals of economic development, diminishing cross border and internal tensions, and demonstrate to the Iraqi people that they are not alone.

- (C/REL ROK) We need ROK to continue in its leadership role in MND-NE by maintaining these troop levels through the end of 2007, and particularly maintaining the command structure/headquarters of MND-NE.

- (C/REL ROK) Can you share your 2007 plans for supporting OIF?

- (C/REL ROK) How does ROK envisage its posture changing after Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)?

- (C/REL ROK) Post-PIC security arrangements will be with whom: ISF or Peshmerga? What is confidence level in police for post-PIC?

UN Protection Force (UNPF)

- (C/REL ROK) Given USG role in recruiting ROK to the UNPF, obtain ROK assessment of the mission. Is ROK satisfied with what the UN asks it to do? Are UN requests for ROK resources, including convoy escort, reasonable? Does ROK believe the UN is effectively utilizing its presence? How could UN operations be improved? Is there any role that ROK recommends the U.S. play in affecting the UN mission in Erbil?

JAPAN

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

- (C/REL JAPAN) Request extension of flight hours of Japan's C-130s; reason for this request is to allow a stop at Tallil Airbase to ferry U.S. PRT members and cargo; same need exists for Italians at Dhi Qar. We are seeking nonreimbursable flights for civilian members of PRT with assignment of a high enough priority to ensure regular flight availability.

Ideally the JASDF C-130 would stop in Tallil en route to Baghdad and on the return flight as well.

- (C/REL JAPAN) Thank you for your generous pledge of \$3.5 billion in soft loans Japan at the Madrid donor's conference in 2004. What needs to happen to put those loans into action? Have you received sufficient information from GOI, project proposals etc., to proceed on disbursement? If not, how does that impact disbursement? How will monies be disbursed if Japanese companies are not operating in Iraq? Might part of the solution be to second a finance/accounting expert to Baghdad who can ensure efficient and rapid disbursement of Japan's loans, and provide GOJ accountability and transparency? This would be a function separate from the diplomat in the NCT disbursing small quick-impact grants.

- (C/REL JAPAN) Seek clarity on reported \$30 million contribution from Japan to IOM? What is purpose of funds? When do they expire?

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